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A Comparative Framing Analysis of 
Embedded and Behind-the-Lines 
Reporting on the 2003 Iraq War 
 




     A 2003 study by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found 
that “Most Americans (53 percent) believe that news organizations are politically 
biased, while just 29 percent say they are careful to remove bias from their re-
ports”  (Harper, 2004). Although it would seem that the audience for news has a 
strong concern that news products are slanted in some way, scholarly opinion on 
the media bias issue is far from settled (Cooper, in press; Vatz, 2003). 
     Although a contested position, we believe that reporters and editors frame the 
news in a way that reflects their personal feelings and newsroom culture (Kuypers, 
1997, 2002, 2005; Cooper, in press). Audiences usually receive their political news 
from only a few press sources; rarely do they read the original statements of those 
being reported upon. Yet all that one has to do to see how the press changes--
regardless of intentionality--the meaning of covered material is to compare the 
frames used by the press with those in the material being reported. For example, if 
the press reports on a politician’s speech, compare the actual speech to the press 
accounts of that speech. 
     Cohen (1963) made an astute observation: the press “may not be very success-
ful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about” (p. 13). For example, McCombs and Shaw (1972) 
found that voters learn about an issue in direct proportion to the attention given 
that issue by the press, and that voters tend to share what the media defines as 
important. This is called agenda setting. Subsequent studies into agenda setting 
confirmed that the media have enormous influence upon political decision making, 
and that they are considerably influential in telling the general population what to 
think about. In short, there is a direct correlation between the amount of news 
coverage of an issue and the level of importance the public assigns to that issue. 
     Moving beyond studies of agenda setting, one finds that the news media also 
suggest how one should think. Kuypers (1997, 2002, 2005) called this agenda-
extension, and it occurs when the press moves beyond a neutral reporting of events. 
One manifestation of agenda extension is in the framing of news stories. A frame is 
“a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what 
is at issue” (Gamson, 1989, p. 157). Facts remain neutral until framed; thus, how 
the press frames an issue or event will affect public understanding of that issue or 
event. On this point Gamson argued that facts “take on their meaning by being 
embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, 
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others” (p. 157). Framing thus 
elevates the salience of some facts over others. A powerful example of agenda 
extension is found in a study by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991). These 
researchers used mandatory testing for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) as 
the issue for their study. They found that the effect “of framing is to prime values 
differentially, establishing the salience of the one or the other. [A] majority of the 
public supports the rights of persons with AIDS [acquired imuno-deficiency syn-
drome] when the issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties considerations--and 
supports . . . mandatory testing when the issue is framed to accentuate public health 
considerations” (p. 52). Whereas agenda setting would allow us to count the 
instances of press comments on this topic, framing analysis allows us to discover 
how the comments shape our perceptions of the topic. 
     Although it can be argued that providing contextual cues for interpretation of 
events is a necessary part of reporting, when journalists infuse their political pre- 
ferences into news stories the potential for manipulation of audience perceptions 
increases. This becomes especially important when one considers that a powerful 
feature of frames is that they define problems, causes, and solutions, although not 
necessarily in that order (Kuypers, 1997, 2002; Entman, 1993). In addition, they 
provide the journalist’s moral judgments concerning these problems, causes, and 
solutions (Kuypers, 2002, in press). In short, when journalists frame, they construct 
a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be inter- 
preted in a specific way. Thus journalists can, knowingly or unknowingly, guide 
the interpretation of readers toward a particular point of view.  
Comparative Framing Analysis: One War, Two Frames 
     A fruitful way to study frames is with comparative framing analysis (Kuypers, 
1997, 2002; Entman, 1991). In the present study we looked for differences in war 
reporting between journalists embedded with combat units and journalists based 
behind-the-lines. Embedded reporters were those who traveled with combat troops 
and essentially co-existed with a particular unit in the field. Behind-the-lines re-
porters were those reporters positioned away from the combat or even based in the 
USA. The stories we analyzed appeared in the New York Times and Washington 
Post . 
     Using these two papers has its advantages and drawbacks. One advantage is that 
both papers are still considered papers of records. Another advantage is that both 
have the necessary resources to fund continuous coverage of any topic, thus differ-
ences in framing are unlikely to flow from limited staff or resources. The drawback 
is that we analyzed the news products of a small number of reporters. Although we 
feel it quite unlikely, it is conceivable that some differences in framing between the 
stories of embedded journalists and those of behind-the-lines journalists observed 
in this study are not representative of news outlets in general, but rather are a 
feature of these two particular newspapers. To the extent possible, we matched 
stories run by embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters by date of public- 
cation. This was done to reduce the possibility that any framing differences observ-
ed were due to changes in combat conditions, rather than a property of the journal- 
istic environment. As a practical matter, one day’s difference in date was still con- 
sidered to be a match. We limited our pool of stories to hard news stories and 
featured commentaries on the day’s events; we did not examine every story about 
the war. Rather, we chose stories from embedded and behind-the-lines reporters 
that were about the same event so that we could look for any differences in how 
the reporters framed the event. 
     We examined 66 stories published between 21 March 2003 and 10 April 2003; 
26 from embedded reporters and 40 from behind-the-lines reporters. Our analysis 
discovered two prominent themes in coverage of the war: the strength of Iraqi 
army resistance and the response of the Iraqi civilian population to the Allied 
incursion. Because of space limitations, the following two sections only illustrate 
the framing differences we observed in the coverage. 
 
Iraqi Military Resistance 
 
     Stories written by embedded reporters described Iraqi soldiers surrendering; 
Iraqi positions destroyed by artillery and aircraft attacks; Iraqi soldiers deserting; 
and Allied officers surprised by the weakness of Iraqi resistance. In contrast, 
stories written by behind-the-lines journalists featured Allied casualties and equip-
ment losses; the potential for unconventional attacks by the Iraqi military; the 
ferocity of paramilitary or irregular Iraqi forces; the possibility of urban combat 
situations in cities such as Baghdad; and the belligerent rhetoric of Iraqi officials. 
     Stories about the commencement of hostilities ran on 21 March 2003. In the 
New York Times, the headline of the story filed by an embedded reporter was, 
“G.I.’s and Marines See Little Iraqi Resistance” (Myers, 2003, March 21). Much of 
this story described how easily the Allied forces overran the Iraqi border defenses, 
and noted that “the first two border posts turned out to be empty, their soldiers 
having fled.” The headline of the story filed from Kuwait was quite different: “16 
Die On Copter; U.S. and British Forces Suffer First Losses in Crash in Kuwait” 
(Tyler, 2003, March 21). Two days later, a story by another embedded reporter 
described many Iraqi soldiers surrendering, and only limited resistance. This story 
framed the combat as “general retreat by the Iraqis with groups of fierce holdouts” 
(Filkins, 2003, March 23). In contrast, the headline story in that issue (Tyler, 2003, 
March 23), with a Kuwait dateline, emphasized Allied casualties and loss of 
vehicles, mentioned “heavy fighting and mortar exchanges” from the Iraqi forces, 
and commented that there was “no outward sign Saturday that either the 
government or military command of Mr. Hussein was wavering.” In the next day’s 
issue a front-page opinion piece (Apple, 2003, March 24), datelined Washington, 
described the Iraqi resistance as stiffening, and tougher than Allied commanders 
had expected. An overview article (Collins, 2003, March 24) referred to the 
coming “showdown with the Iraqi Republican Guard,” described the area around 
Baghdad as “intensely defended,” and commented that on the prior day “allied 
forces faced the fiercest fighting of the war so far and suffered their grimmest 
casualty toll.” 
     The contrast between the frames of the behind-the-lines journalists and the 
frames of the embedded reporters was even more striking as the serious fighting 
for control of Baghdad began. The headline of a hard news story by a journalist 
based in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003, April 3) referred to the coming “climactic 
defense” of the city. Iraqi officials were described as “defiant,” and said to “boast 
that the country’s most vaunted units are primed to repel an assault for which they 
have planned for years.” This story continued the frame that the battle would 
become “block-by-block guerilla warfare, with civilians caught in between.” An 
analysis by behind-the-lines journalists (Ricks & Weisman, 2003, April 3) framed 
the situation as a “dilemma” for the Allied forces, who faced urban combat against 
“Hussein’s most loyal fighters, drawn from the Republican Guard and his body-
guard Special Republican Guard,” who might be planning to “hol[e] up in the city 
and wag[e] a grinding war of attrition.” The lead story (Chandrasekaran & Baker, 
2003, April 3), datelined Kuwait City, did describe resistance to the Allied advance 
as “only patchy,” but nonetheless framed the situation as “the climactic battle--/and 
the most dangerous.” 
     This is in stark contrast to stories from the embedded reporters of the Washing-
ton Post . One story (Branigin, 2003, April 3) was headlined, “No Sign of Capital 
Defenses.” This reporter’s unit encountered “surprisingly little resistance,” and the 
Republican Guard units were described as “disintegrating,” with no sign of “the 
heavy Iraqi equipment expected to mount the main defense of Baghdad.” Another 
story (Finer, 2003, April 3) described a unit moving “more than 70 miles through 
Iraq’s central desert in an advance that met little opposition.” These troops took 
control of a strategically important airfield abandoned by a “fleeing Iraqi army.” 
     The war front moved into Baghdad over the next few days. Stories from embed-
ded reporters painted a mixed picture of relative quiet punctuated by firefights, but 
the stories from behind-the lines journalists based in Baghdad--now close to the 
front lines!--tended to emphasize the intensity of the fighting. An embedded 
reporter described a unit searching for Iraqi troops in a suburb of Baghdad, but 
finding only abandoned positions (Finer, 2003, April 8). The army unit occupying 
the airport in Baghdad encountered only “sporadic” resistance (Branigin, 2003, 
April 7), but another brigade tasked with securing an intersection in the southern 
part of the city became involved in “five hours of killing and fiery chaos” 
(Branigin, 2003, April 8). An embedded reporter detailed a protracted firefight at a 
river crossing (Filkins, 2003, April 8), and characterized the Iraqi resistance as 
“tough, but uncoordinated.” 
     Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists framed the hostilities as being more 
intense. One described Baghdad as having become a “war zone,” and referred to 
Republican Guard troops and armament having “poured into the capital,” while 
irregular forces carrying rocket propelled grenades moved in the streets (Shadid, 
2003, April 6). Another described the gun battles as “fierce” and the Allied 
advance as “grinding” (Tyler, 2003, April 7). As Allied forces began consolidating 
their control of the city, Iraqi resistance was still described as “fierce” (Burns, 
2003, April 8; Shadid & Chandrasekaran, 2003, April 8). An analysis in the New 
York Times (Apple, 2003, April 9; Apple, 2003, April 10) characterized the 
resistance as “stubborn,” and commented that “news of fierce fighting in Hilla . . . 
belies talk of collapse.” 
 
Iraqi Civilian Response to the Allied Forces  
 
     Another important theme in the coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the 
response of Iraqi civilians to the incursion by Allied forces. Early reporting, both 
from embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters, dealt mostly with combat 
operations, but a distinct theme of civilian response developed after the first week 
or so of fighting. 
     In general, the reporting from behind-the-lines journalists featured collateral 
damage caused by combat; privations suffered by Iraqi civilians after combat 
passed through their areas; and resentment toward occupation troops. In contrast, 
reports from embedded journalists described positive interactions between Allied 
soldiers and Iraqi civilians; Allied efforts to restore basic utilities to the civilian 
population; Iraqi civilians’ fear of reprisals by Baath Party and Saddam Fedayeen 
members; and civilians celebrating the collapse of the Hussein regime. 
     Initially cautious, civilian response to Allied troops grew warmer after the first 
week of combat, at least in the reports from embedded reporters. Two stories des-
cribed Iraqis standing by the road and waving at convoys headed toward Baghdad 
(Branigin, 2003, April 3; Finer, 2003, April 3). Several stories from a journalist 
embedded with units entering Najaf (Atkinson, 2003, April 2; Atkinson, 2003, 
April 3; Atkinson, 2003, April 10) likewise framed the civilian response as wel-
coming, even in the turmoil of war. In the first, civilians were described smiling at 
American troops, clapping, and “gestur[ing] impatiently for the Americans to press 
deeper into the city center.” The next day’s story framed the welcome as “jubil-
ant,” but noted residents’ concerns that food and water had become scarce. 
Another reporter embedded with troops approaching Baghdad described civilians 
“cheering and encouraging the troops as they passed,” framing what he saw as 
“one of the warmest receptions the Americans have gotten to date” (Filkins, 2003, 
April 4). An Iraqi civilian fleeing Baghdad was quoted as saying, “You have saved 
us, you have saved us from him.” 
     Stories written behind-the-lines, covering the same time period, were strikingly 
different in their framing of the civilian response to the Allied incursion. One story 
described the burial of a young boy killed in Baghdad (Shadid, 2003, March 
31).Although the story noted that the boy may well have been killed by shrapnel 
from Iraqi antiaircraft fire, it framed the residents of the neighborhood as angry at 
the USA for civilian casualties and resentful at the prospect of an occupation. A 
story datelined from Zubair (Glasser, 2003, April 5), filed after the fighting had 
moved on to Basra, described civilians’ “ambivalence” about the incursion in this 
way: “On the streets, children wave and smile at passing British troops. At the 
now-empty police station, a banner hangs. Shame on America, it says.” 
     An analysis in the New York Times (Apple, 2003, April 6) referred to “the 
natural tendency of many Iraqis to feel their patriotic impulses bruised by the 
presence of heavily armed invaders [emphasis added] in their midst.” This is in 
stark contrast to the frame of an embedded reporter’s story (LeDuff, 2003, April 8) 
about American troops entering a town of 45,000: “by noon it was apparent that 
the townspeople considered [the troops] liberators.” The crowd’s reaction is 
described as “euphoria,” and a resident was quoted as saying, “you are owed a 




     Reporting about Operation Iraqi Freedom differed greatly between embedded 
and behind-the-lines reporters. The embedded journalists often described the war 
in terms of the weakness of Iraqi army resistance; the frequency with which regular 
Iraqi forces deserted or surrendered; and the joy of Iraqi civilians at the demise of 
the Hussein regime. Their stories described the confusion and uncertainty of fire-
fights; the tedium and fatigue inherent in warfare; the precise targeting of Allied 
ordinance; the pinpoint destruction such weapons produced; and friendly interact-
ions between Allied soldiers and Iraqi civilians. 
     Stories filed by behind-the-lines journalists described the war in terms of the 
potential of Iraqi forces to mount significant unconventional counterattacks; the 
ferocity of the Iraqi irregular forces; the inadequacy of Allied war planning; and 
the vulnerability of the Allies’ long supply lines. These stories emphasized civilian 
anger at collateral damage; interruptions to utility infrastructure; and mistrust of 
American intentions. 
     In part, these differences in framing can be attributed to the activities and 
conditions reporters could directly observe. Embedded journalists, traveling with 
combat forces, directly experienced the tedium, intensity, danger, and uncertainty 
of those situations; they observed first-hand the dominance of Allied tactics and 
weaponry, and the elation of Iraqi civilians as the Hussein regime disintegrated. 
Behind-the-lines journalists witnessed different aspects of the war. At a physical 
distance from the actual fighting, their stories concerned the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the war’s course, the anarchy that sometimes developed when 
the control mechanisms of the Hussein regime collapsed, the potential--but not the 
actuality--for significant Iraqi military resistance and counterattacks, and the 
belligerent rhetoric of the Iraqi Minister of Information. 
     We feel it implausible to attribute the framing differences to military control 
over the reporting of the embedded reporters. The Department of Defense directive 
that established embedding as policy (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003) specifi-
cally ruled out interference with reporters’ copy (paragraph 3.R), stated that the 
purpose of embedding was to maximize reporters’ access to information paragraph 
2.A), and required that restrictions on the release of information in their possession 
had to be justified (paragraph 3.R). 
     The practice of embedding journalists with combat units was a significant 
change in Department of Defense media policy (Cooper, 2003). Embedding 
replaced the pool coverage used in the Persian Gulf War, which had prompted 
complaints from news outlets and organizations about restricted access to the 
combat theater. Journalists covering the 2003 Iraq War also had the option of being 
credentialed as “unilateral,” which meant they were not affiliated with a particular 
combat unit, but did not enjoy the logistical support, physical protection, or 
immediate access to operations provided to the embedded journalists. Some 
journalists chose to cover the war as unilaterals (Fisher, 2003; Ricchiardi, 2003a). 
     Prior to the start of hostilities, there was a predictable skepticism about the 
promised openness of the combat theater to journalists (e.g., Bushell & Cunning-
ham, 2003; Ricchiardi, 2003a), and concern about the possibility that embedded 
journalists would lose the required critical distance from the events they covered 
(e.g., Bedway, 2003; Chasen, 2003; Cockburn, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Martin, 2003; 
Strupp & Berman, 2003). In general, however, the embedding policy proved 
satisfactory to both the military and the press (Blumenthal & Rutenberg, 2003; 
Cooper, 2003; Fisher, 2003; Galloway, 2003; Mitchell & Bedway, 2003; 
Ricchiardi, 2003b; Rieder, 2003; Shooting at the Messenger, 2003; Zinsmeister, 
2003). Moreover, returning journalists have not voiced complaints about their 
experiences while embedded, and many papers have continued with the practice 
(Arrieta-Walden, 2004). In sum, any notion that the copy of embedded reporters 
was censored by the military while that of behind-the-lines journalists was free 
from interference--and that the framing differences are attributable to the greater 
freedom of the behind-the-lines journalists--is not supported. 
     One of the persistent problems in the discussion of media bias is the question of 
a baseline measurement against which any purported bias can be measured. We do 
not mean to suggest here that the embedded reporters were somehow free of 
preconceptions that might color their field reports. It is worth noting, however, that 
both the embedded and the behind-the-lines journalists were drawn from the same 
pool; that is to say, all reporters were acculturated into the current norms of their 
profession, before they reported on the war. To what, then, can those differences in 
the framing of their war reporting be attributed? 
     Although we cannot conclusively demonstrate this to be the case, we strongly 
feel it likely that behind-the-lines reporters were less able than embedded reporters 
to divorce themselves from the editorial positions of their respective papers, and 
the general climate of media opposition concerning military action. After all, while 
embedded reporters were relaying their eye-witness testimony, behind-the-lines 
reporters relied on second hand accounts filtered through their preconceptions con- 
cerning the outcome of the war (Kuypers, 2002). Here lies the important point of 
this study. The power of the behind-the-lines reporters’ established frames greatly 
influenced how they reported the war; whereas embedded reporters, observing 
direct contradictions of their previously established frames, were in a better posi-
tion to report on what they actually witnessed. In some sense, then, this presented 
audiences with a choice on how to view the war. Embedded reporters presented a 
much more positive view of US military actions and possibilities than did their 
behind-the-lines counterparts. Once the practice of embedded reporting diminish-
ed, readers increasingly lost this choice, because the previously established and 
dominate framing of the mainstream press returned (Kuypers, in press). 
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